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“And all this back and forthing over who did what and what strategy was used and which money was 
public and which was private is probably going to sink below the radar screen.” (Francis Collins)1 
“The prevailing view is that the genome is going to revolutionize biology, but in some way, it’s 
overhyped. In the end, the real insights are coming from individuals studying one gene at a time in real 
depth.” (Gerald Rubin)2 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We present a detailed synthesis of the development of the Human Genome Project (HGP) from 1986 
to 2003 in order to test the “social bubble” hypothesis that strong social interactions between 
enthusiastic supporters of the HGP weaved a network of reinforcing feedbacks that led to a 
widespread endorsement and extraordinary commitment by those involved in the project, beyond what 
would be rationalized by a standard cost-benefit analysis in the presence of extraordinary uncertainties 
and risks. The vigorous competition and race between the initially public project and several private 
initiatives is argued to support the social bubble hypothesis. We also present quantitative analyses of 
the concomitant financial bubble concentrated on the biotech sector. Confirmation of this hypothesis is 
offered by the present consensus that it will take decades to exploit the fruits of the HGP, via a slow 
and arduous process aiming at disentangling the extraordinary complexity of the human complex 
body. The HGP has ushered other initiatives, based on the recognition that there is much that 
genomics cannot do, and that “the future belongs to proteomics”. We present evidence that the 
competition between the public and private sector actually played in favor of the former, since its 
financial burden as well as its horizon was significantly reduced (for a long time against its will) by 
the active role of the later. This suggests that governments can take advantage of the social bubble 
mechanism to catalyze long-term investments by the private sector, which would not otherwise be 
supported.  
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1 Francis Collins, interview with Leslie Roberts, 19 August 1999; Roberts et al. 2001. 
2 Gerald Rubins, interview with Elizabeth Pennisi, Februrary 2000; Roberts et al. 2001. 
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1–Introduction 
 
The Human Genome Project (HGP), a genuine innovation in the molecular biology sector, begun 
formally in 1990. It was coordinated by the U.S. Department of Energy and the National Institutes of 
Health, and was completed in 2003. It was one of the largest international scientific research projects, 
with the primary goal of determining the sequence of chemical base pairs which make up DNA, and to 
identify and map the approximately 20,000–25,000 genes of the human genome from both a physical 
and functional standpoint (Watson and Cook-Deegan, 1991; Cook Deegan, 1991; 1994; Gilbert, 1992; 
Hilgartner, 1994; 1997; 1998; 2004; Koonin, 1998; Jordan and Lynch, 1998; Roberts, et al., 2001; 
Kieff, 2003). It was launched on the rational that, with all the genes identified and available in 
computerized data banks, genetic mapping3 and sequencing data would utterly transform biology, 
biotechnology, and medicine in the next century.  
 
This large-scale project provides an excellent example to study the patterns of an innovation at large 
and the social bubble hypothesis that we have formulated elsewhere (Gisler and Sornette, 2009; 
Sornette and Gisler, forthcoming). We hypothesized that, when new technology or scientific options 
open up, and individual or groups believe to be ready for it, then they dive into these new 
opportunities, often without apparent concern for the risks and possible adverse consequences. 
According to the social bubble hypothesis, the social interactions between enthusiastic supporters 
weave a network of reinforcing feedbacks that lead to widespread endorsement and extraordinary 
commitment by those involved in the project. The term “bubble” is borrowed from the financial 
economic literature, in which a bubble is defined as a transient appreciation of prices above 
fundamental value, resulting from excessive expectations of future capital gain.  
 
Sornette (2008) has suggested that the following major inventions could be instances of such social 
bubbles: the great boom of railway in Britain in the 1840s, the Human Genome project, the cloning of 
mammals (Dolly, the sheep), and the ICT (Internet-Communication-Technology) bubble culminating 
in 2000. The adventure of nanotechnology or the craze over Haute Couture (‘the democratization of 
fashion design’) could be added to the list. A property shared by these cases is that they were all 
characterized by extremely high expectations concerning the outcome of the proposed research and/or 
innovation project. Therefore, enthusiasm was high at the start of the project, leading to the readiness 
to take large risks, which may have been at the origin of innovations that can turn out to be 
tremendously valuable on the long term. Some of these innovations led to fast societal progress and 
structural changes, others captured the imagination of large groups and proceeded along a roller-
coaster of rising expectations, steep growth and spectacular downturns, with potential future benefits 
still uncertain. They all constitute an essential element in the dynamics of important inventions, and 
are thus crucial for society. 
 
Our working hypothesis is that the nucleation and growth of bubbles play a key role in reducing 
collective risk aversion that normally restrict innovation and discovery processes. Innovation is 
understood as a social process that brings together various actors of different backgrounds and 
interests. During its development, the process is framed by interactions and novel relationships among 
science, business/industry, economy, and politics. Because technological change is so vital for long-
run economic growth, it is of fundamental importance to understand how individuals, firms, and the 
public (via the government) obtain the resources needed to undertake their investments in innovation 
and invention. It is also important to understand how the availability of such resources, including the 
manner in which they are accessed as well as the amounts that can be raised, influences the rate, 
direction, and organization of technological development. The present paper intends to cast light on 
these issues by a detailed analysis of the development of the Human Genome Project (HGP), which 
constitutes a paradigm of a crucial technology jump via a large-scale research project. In particular, we 
focus on the question of how the HGP was funded during its lifetime, as this provides an objective and 
precise metric reflecting the choices of and conflicts between the different involved parties. 
 
                                                
3 Genome mapping is the creation of a genetic map assigning DNA fragments to chromosomes. 
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To put things into perspective, recall that the costs of the HGP, estimated early on at about $3 billion, 
has engendered great concern, raising fears about “big science” and the effect that a project of this 
magnitude might have on other areas of biological research (DeLisi, 1988; Roberts, 1990/248). This 
figure of $3 billion has come up in an early discussion of whether or not to sequence the Human 
Genome; it refers to the numbers calculated by Walter Gilbert (*1932), an early defender of the 
Human Genome Project. At a meeting at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory in June 1986, several of the 
most famous scientists in molecular biology discussed the cost of a potential sequencing process of the 
human genome (Lewin, 1986b/233). Gilbert counted that at $1 per base pair, a reference sequence of 
the human genome could be obtained for about $3 billion. This cost projection provoked uproar, so 
that in response Gilbert suggested to first concentrate on the 1 percent of the genome containing 
biologically known function, then to do the next 10 percent, and only afterwards finish the job, 
devoting equal resources to each phase (Cook-Deegan, 1994). Another attempt to estimate the cost of 
the whole HGP was prepared by the NRC committee in 1988, which projected the need for $200 
million per year over 15 years, to support research centers, grants and technology development, and 
administration (Cook-Deegan, 1991). While these two estimations end up given the same total 
amount, they refer to very different itemizations of the costs of the HGP, which illustrate the 
difficulties in estimating its global costs, especially at its inception (Roberts, 1987b/237). 
 
However, it was argued in many places that the costs should not be considered so extravagant because, 
in addition to the sequencing of the human genome, they would also cover a wide range of other 
scientific activities extending over a 14-year period (1990–2003) including studies of human diseases, 
of experimental organisms (such as bacteria, yeast, worms, flies, and mice), the development of new 
technologies for biological and medical research, computational methods to analyze genomes, and 
investigations on ethical, legal, and social issues related to genetics. Human genome sequencing was 
argued to represent just a fraction of the overall budget. 
 
The issue of the funding of the HGP is made more intricate and interesting by the fact that, in addition 
to the major contributions of the U.S. government (see table 1) and of other public institutions (the UK 
Wellcome Trust, and other countries such as France, Germany, Japan, and so on), Celera Genomics 
and other firms were pursuing separately the route of private venture capital. Yet, the issue of where 
the money came from, how it was raised, what arguments were brought forth in favor or against the 
HGP, has hardly been scrutinized in the literature. In our study, we will rely in particular on the data 
collection performed by a group organized by Robert Cook-Deegan on the money spent for 
biotechnology endeavors (Stanford-in-Washington. World Survey of Genomics Research 
www.stanford.edu/class/siw198q/websites/genomics/entry.htm; retrieved June 1, 2009; Cook-Deegan 
et al., 2000; Reineke and Cook-Deegan, 2008; Chandrasekharan et al., 2009).  
 
In this paper, we focus on the question of investment associated with the HGP. We try to understand 
the influences that motivated to invest into the project, and how its directions were channeled. This 
allows us to assess and quantify the importance of government spending and funding (and its 
legitimization), based on the premise by Nelson (1959) that public subsidy of science is legitimized by 
the recognition of inefficiencies in the market for scientific knowledge. Nelson contents that the 
uncertain nature of the output of basic research means that private investors cannot be sure they will 
benefit from their investment and, as a consequence, a purely market-based system would tend to 
invest at lower than the economically and socially desirable levels. Because of the uncertainty about 
the direction of any future development of basic research, private companies might be drawn to 
withdraw from any kind of funding. However, in the presence of public investment on basic research, 
private investors could come in later, at a lower risk level (Fabrizio and Mowery, 2007). This raises 
the interesting question of what percentage of the GDP of a country should be allocated to science by 
governments. Determining the right level is very difficult given the large uncertainties (Sornette and 
Zajdenweber, 1999). Too little would thwart innovation, productivity and economic growth. Too much 
could be a waste (Gersbach et al., 2008). 
 
This discussion can be understood within the context of the Government-Industry-University 
relationship, recently labeled as the “Triple Helix”: the increased importance of knowledge gives 
universities a central position in the transfer of academic knowledge to foster industrial innovations 
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according to a back-and-forth interactive and iterative process, rather than via the obsolete linear 
model of innovation (Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz, 1998; Etzkowitz 2002; 2003; see also Stokes, 1997). 
As firms raise their technological level, they move closer to an academic model, engaging in higher 
levels of training and in sharing of knowledge. Governments act as a public entrepreneur and venture 
capitalist in addition to their traditional regulatory role in setting the rules (Mansfield, 1995). Moving 
beyond product development, innovation becomes an endogenous process, encouraging hybridization 
among the institutional spheres. 
 
We thus ask the question whether or not this “Triple Helix” mechanism was at play for the HGP. 
Implicit in this question is the assumption that, generally speaking, governments fund science, whereas 
technology is mainly privately funded. Given that governments support by various means the 
generation of inventions with the goal of increasing productivity (Orsenigo, 1993), a very important 
question in this respect is: who was first? Was it the private sector (drug companies and/or venture 
capitalists) that convinced the government to step in and provide coordination help and funding? Or 
was it a set of universities? Or was it the government which more or less on its own appropriated a 
fancy project to make “a big show” – comparable to the Apollo Program (Gisler and Sornette, 2009)? 
For the sake of conciseness, we will focus on the U.S. only, even though the UK, namely the Sanger 
Institute, funded by the Wellcome Trust, was apparently an equally important partner of the HGP 
(Balmer, 1996; Sulston and Ferry, 2002). In this respect, we have analyzed the several progress reports 
of the different agencies involved. Furthermore we have scrutinized dozens of scientific journals as 
well as monographs based on interviews with the protagonists. We will investigate whether standard 
cost-benefit and portfolio analysis can explain the HGP. This will allow us to test our hypothesis that, 
with over-optimistic expectations, people focus almost solely on the expected returns of an invention 
and tend to forget its risks. There are risks whose magnitude are so big that they cannot be funded by 
private investors, thus only governments can take the ‘systemic’ large risks on their shoulders, by 
using the largest reservoir of funds provided by the pool of taxpayers.  
 
We structure the paper as follows. Section 2 describes the context and process of the nucleation of the 
HGP. Sections 3–7 document and compare the public component of the HGP to the private initiatives, 
their interplay, rivalry and entanglement, which were defining sociological characteristics of its 
development. Section 3 describes an early attempt by Walter Gilbert to take the genome project 
private. Section 4 presents the public approach to the HGP. Section 5 discusses Craig Venter’s Celera 
Genomics approach to the human project and how it forced the publicly funded project to evolve. 
Section 6 describes the development and progressive transformation of the public effort. Section 7 
shows how the rivalry between the public and private projects led to the transformation of the former 
to endorse more risky approaches with stronger links with industry. This section also describes the 
explosion of investments in new biotech firms by venture capitalists and by Wall Street investors in 
the second half of the 1990s. Section 8 presents quantitative evidence for the existence of a financial 
biotech bubble, paralleling the development of the HGP, which culminated in March 2000, a few 
month before the official announcement of the completion of the HGP on June 26, 2000. We take 
special care in trying to separate the pure biotech component of the bubble from the overall ICT 
bubble that also crashed in March 2000. Section 9 describes the completion of the HGP. Section 10 
concludes that the public-private competition documented here provides support to the social bubble 
view of the nucleation, development and completion of the HGP. We also briefly comment on how 
much of the expectations justifying the HGP have been reassessed ex-post, further supporting the 
existence of exuberant over-optimism characteristic of a bubble Zeitgeist. 
 
 
2–Emergence 
 
The Human Genome Project (HGP) is an assemblage rather than a single entity, which emerged from 
decades of research on genetics (Cantor, 1990; Hedgecoe and Martin, 2008; Rheinberger, 2008). The 
scientific foundation for a human genome initiative existed at the U.S. national laboratories before the 
establishment of the first genome project. Besides expertise in a number of areas critical to genomic 
research, the laboratories had a long history of conducting large multidisciplinary projects. The HGP’s 
actual start is difficult to define. In general, a few important workshops in the nascent field of genome 
  5 
analysis in the 1980s are seen as the beginning of the initiative. Particularly, an Alta summit in 1984 
(Cook-Deegan, 1989) and a Santa Cruz meeting in 1985 (Sinsheimer, 1989) are seen as the launch of 
the Human Genome initiative. At the latter, the attending group of high-ranking scientists from the 
U.S. and the UK decided that it made sense to develop systematically a genetic linkage map, i.e. a 
physical map of ordered clones. Once a gene has been isolated, the next step is to sequence it, that is, 
to determine its internal structure. The sequencing efforts, the panel agreed, should first focus on 
automation and development of faster and cheaper techniques (Cook Deegan, 1994). 
 
Besides the point that the best possible investment a nation can make for its future was, next to 
education, science, the main argument at that time was that investing into genome research was 
investing into research on the genes believed to be involved in the diseases and on their potential cure. 
In fact, research on genes was fueled by the aspiration to track down diseases, assumed to be inherited 
via genes (Cook-Deegan, 1994; DeLisi, 1988). For example, when the Cystic Fibrosis gene was found 
in 1989, researchers were certain that therapy was around the corner. The same is true for the many 
cancer types, or hereditary diseases. Knowledge of the genome and availability of probes for any gene 
was seen as crucial for the progress on diagnosis and therapeutics. In a seminal paper, e.g., Renato 
Dulbecco urged for including the study of the cellular genome in order to progress on cancer research 
(Dulbecco, 1986). Moreover, the very positive reception of the government and the public to the HGP 
was most likely due to the alleged priority set forth to detect disease genes. When the project started, 
though, other topics were given priority over finding genes that might hold diseases. And two decades 
later, one has to state that there is still much to do, and one is in fact tempted to declare that “The 
disease has contributed much more to science [i.e. to the support for the Human Genome Project] than 
science has contributed to the disease.” (Jack Riordan, cited by Pearson, 2009/460: 165). 
 
To DeLisi, then head of the Office of Health and Environmental Research at the Department of 
Energy (DOE), the genome project was a logical outgrowth of DOE’s mandate to study the effects of 
radiation on human health. At his urging, Los Alamos National Laboratory hosted a workshop in 
Santa Fe, New Mexico, in March 1986, the first workshop under the auspices of DOE (DeLisi, 1988; 
2008). The idea laid out at this Santa Fe workshop quickly gained momentum, dominating discussion 
at a meeting a few months later at the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory in New York. By then, 
biologists were beginning to think the project just might be doable (DeLisi, 1988; Cook-Deegan, 
1994). Mapping the human genome seemed not to be too far, estimates varied between two and five 
years. The symposium marked a transition from emphasizing the sequencing of the human genome to 
a broader plan for genetic linkage mapping, physical mapping, and the study of nonhuman organisms. 
It is worthwhile to mention that, according to Cook-Deegan (1991), the public remained largely 
ignorant of the project even after it had been under way for a couple of years. 
 
DeLisi eventually gained support for the project, first from his superiors at DOE and then from 
Congress, starting a small Human Genome Initiative within DOE in 1986 (Cantor, 1990). In April 
1987, the initiative was endorsed by a report from the Department’s Health and Environmental 
Research Advisory Committee (HERAC) (Subcommittee on Human Genome of the Health and 
Environmental Research Advisory Committee for the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Energy 
Research Office of Health and Environmental Research, 1987). The HERAC report urged DOE and 
the nation to commit to a large, long-term, multidisciplinary, technological undertaking to order and 
sequence the human genome (Palca, 1987; Barnhart, 1989). The physical map of the human genome – 
the report presumed – could be done by DOE as well as universities and industry. 
 
Involvement in this initiative was seen as a consequence of DOE’s demonstrated expertise in handling 
projects of this size and scope. Subsequent reports from the National Academy of Sciences and the 
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) supported the HERAC report by endorsing a 
major national effort at a sustained level of $200 million annually (U.S. Congress, Office of 
Technology Assessment, 1988). The initiative was seen as having substantive long-term impacts on 
basic science and on biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries, as well as on the practice of 
medicine. The long-range goal of this dedicated research was to develop and provide the broad array 
of resources and technologies that would allow the complete characterization of the human genome at 
the molecular level. The OTA report differs from others on the topic in that it explored implications of 
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the project that had been neglected thus far. Especially, it pointed out that those physical maps, genetic 
linkage maps, clone repositories and genetic databases will all become available as a result of the 
project, and will have immediate utility for the biological sciences. This report also raised some 
difficult issues relating to patents, copyrights and technology transfer that will arise as private 
companies and foreign governments join federally-supported research laboratories in working on the 
project. 
 
Today, DOE is seen as the first federal agency to have announced and funded a genome program (see 
www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/project/whydoe.shtml; retrieved March 3, 2010). 
The fact, however, that DOE was lobbying for the project only heightened some biologists’ unease, 
who put emphasis on the peer-review system. Little enthusiasm came from younger scientists, who 
feared that a mega billion-dollar project would divert money away from single investigator-initiated 
research grants and slow down the pace at which high-quality biological and medical research was 
carried out in the U.S. (Lewin, 1986c/233; 1986d/233; Watson, 1990). The fear furthermore was not 
so much about big science, but alleged bad science (DeLisi, 1988; Roberts, 2001/291). In fact, the 
Human Genome Project was never considered as passing for big science (in reports such as the OTA 
report e.g.), and it was never perceived as big science by Science and Technology Studies scholars, 
even though it was at the center of biomedical research after 1987 and retained this status for several 
years. At the same time, the project was never really put into question. Fears were more concerned 
with its size, and whether or not it would drain money from other biotechnology projects (Roberts, 
1990/248). Back in 1986, it is noteworthy that the interest in sequencing the entire human genome was 
sometimes decreasing with more enthusiasm was placed on mapping (Lewin, 1986d/233). 
 
Political posturing continued until 1988, when a National Research Council (NRC) committee gave 
the project its official seal of approval (Committee on Mapping and Sequencing the Human Genome, 
National Research Council, 1988). It was urged that federal funding should rise quickly to $200 
million a year, with the project planned to be completed in approximately 15 years (Watson, 1990; 
Roberts, 1988a/239). At the same time, an ad hoc advisory committee on complex genomes within 
NIH followed Wyngaarden’s proposal to establish an Office of Human Genome Research to be 
headed by a new associate. In late 1989, the Human Genome Project began to consolidate. In October 
1989, under James Watson, the Office of Human Genome Research became the National Center for 
Human Genome Research (NCHGR) (Roberts, 1988b/241; Roberts, 1989b/245). Watson declared the 
official start of the genome project as October 1990, corresponding to the beginning of fiscal year 
1991. If there was initially uncertainty over how the NIH and DOE program would be coordinated 
(Watson, 1990), with this move, NIH was firmly established as the lead agency. The project was urged 
to start by constructing maps of the human chromosomes. Full-scale sequencing would be postponed 
until new technologies made it faster and cheaper (Cook-Deegan, 1994; Roberts, 2001/291). 
Altogether, it had taken five years for the genome project to be translated from an idea into the 
beginnings of an international scientific project (Watson and Cook-Deegan, 1991). 
 
 
3–Private I: Walter Gilbert goes private 
 
Nobel laureate Walter Gilbert, a molecular biologist who worked with James Watson in the early 
1960s at Harvard, became impatient with the cautious approach to sequencing. Perhaps useful to 
understand his state of mind, he is known to have compared the research of the human genome to the 
search of the Holy Grail. Arguing that the technology was already good enough to sequence the 
human genome, he decided to take the genome project private. In 1986, he left the National Research 
Council, announcing the launch of a genome company, called Genome Corporation (Palca, 1987; 
Roberts, 1987c/237; 2001/291; Cook-Deegan, 1994). His intention was to “create a catalog of all 
human genes which would be made available to everyone for a price.” (Walter Gilbert, cited in 
Roberts, 1987c/237: 358). He expected that customers would include the academic research 
community as well as the pharmaceutical industry. By this statement, he provoked a major 
controversy. The concerns involved the possibility that exchange of data between scientists would be 
slowed down or barred entirely, and furthermore that access to some data would be locked out. The 
expectation of having to compete with corporate scientists left many academics uneasy (Roberts, 
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1987c/237; Sulston and Ferry, 2002). Robert Cook-Deegan, then with the Office of Technology 
Assessment (OTA), expressed loudly what many may have been thinking: “If a company behaves in 
what scientists believe is a socially responsible manner, they can’t make a profit.” (Robert Cook-
Deegan, cited in Roberts 1987c/237). 
 
According to an interview of Gilbert with Cook-Deegan, Gilbert’s idea for Genome Corporation was 
to construct a physical map, do systematic sequencing, and establish a database (Cook-Deegan, 1994, 
interview with Gilbert). He did not speculate publicly on how long his mapping and sequencing effort 
would take, but admitted that his time table was generally more aggressive than that of other people. 
He also reckoned the entire sequencing effort to cost far less than the DOE estimate, more like $300 
million, and to be accomplished within a decade by a modestly sized private company (Palca, 1987). 
 
His plan, which was remarkably similar to J. Craig Venter’s vision half a decade later (see below), was 
to set up a sequencing factory to churn out the data, which he intended to copyright and sell. This 
included selling clones from the map, serving as a sequencing service, and charging user fees for 
access to the database. The market would be academic laboratories and industrial firms, such as 
pharmaceutical companies, that would purchase materials and services from Genome Corporation. The 
purpose was not so much to do things that others could not, but to do them more efficiently, so that 
outside laboratories could purchase services more economically than performing the services 
themselves. These premises fueled Gilbert’s quest to find funding from venture capitalists over the 
course of 1987 and into 1988. In January 1987, he was approached by a foundation in order to help 
create such an institute. The idea died after the foundation funded a study to assess the genome project 
at the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences. Moreover, by late 1987, Wall 
Street’s enthusiasm for biotechnology had turned into skepticism, and the stock market crash in 
October made capitalizing Genome Corporation impossible. The highly publicized efforts to start a 
genome project by the federal government made prospective investors distrustful of competing with 
the public domain. Genome Corporation could succeed only if Gilbert stayed so far ahead of academic 
competition that others would come to him for services, rather than waiting for the information and 
materials to be made freely available. With the failure of the efforts to raise sufficient funds, Gilbert’s 
venture died, and with it – at least for some time – the feud between public and private teams (Roberts, 
1987b/237; 2001/291). 
 
 
4–Public I 
 
At the beginning of 1987, when Gilbert formulated his plans for Genome Corporation, there was no 
center to support efforts in genome mapping and sequencing. Two federal agencies emerged 
eventually that competed for the leadership of the genome project (Roberts, 1987a/237; 1988a/239). In 
1988, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the Department of Energy (DOE) eventually signed 
a Memorandum of Understanding to facilitate cooperation and coordination of genome research and 
development and to establish a joint advisory committee to coordinate these activities. The 
memorandum also established an interagency working group in which staff members of NIH and DOE 
met regularly to discuss research of mutual interests, as well as agency priorities. 
 
In April 1990, NIH and DOE published a five-year plan, whose goals included the completion of a 
genetic map, a physical map, and the sequence of model organisms by 2005 (U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services and U.S. Department of Energy, 1990). In October 1990, the start of the 
project was officially announced. And by the end of the year, both the Department of Energy and the 
National Institutes of Health had genome programs with budgets totaling almost $84 million, and 
similar dedicated genome programs were launched in the United Kingdom, Italy, the Soviet Union, 
Japan, France, and the European Communities (Watson, 1990; Watson and Cook-Deegan, 1991; 
Cook-Deegan, 1994; for France see esp. Kaufmann, 2004). 
 
Notwithstanding a neoliberal orientation of the policies of the 1980s, the U.S. governmental 
expenditures for research did not decrease; on the contrary, they increased annually (Barben, 2007). A 
body which tremendously gained from this process was the National Institutes of Health (NIH), an 
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institution responsible for biomedical and health related research, and a part of the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services. 
 
As the genome project gained congressional funding and scientific respectability, NIH seized control 
from DOE. NIH director James Wyngaarden announced that they would create a special office for 
genome research. The project was initially headed by James D. Watson (*1928), the American 
molecular biologist, best known for being one of the discoverers of the structure of DNA. With this 
initiative, NIH was firmly established as the lead agency (Cook-Degan, 1994; Watson, 1990; Roberts, 
1988b/241). It has remained so, even as the project gathered international collaborators and Britain’s 
Wellcome Trust took on a prominent role in 1992. Watson proved a shrewd strategist: Knowing that 
Congress did not have the patience to wait 15 years for results, he relentlessly pushed forward the first 
stage of the project and its most tangible goal, the build-up of maps of human chromosomes (Roberts, 
2001/291). Even though disease genes captured the public imagination and kept the dollars flowing, it 
was Watson’s (and others’) vision that the project would begin with genetic and physical mapping and 
gradually develop technology to sequence the whole genome, in order to “to find out what being 
human is.” (Roberts, 1989a/243: 167). He predicted that a detailed genetic map of all the human 
chromosomes would be finished within five years. 
 
The issue of gene patenting led to a change of leadership. Quarrelling over patenting was largely 
triggered – even though not new – by J. Craig Venter, then NIH biologist, who in July 1991 
announced that NIH was filing patent applications on thousands of partial genes. Even though the 
series of questions Venter opened up could be considered a priori as legitimate, the issue of patenting 
as a turning point in the commercialization of molecular biology caused controversy (Smith Hughes, 
2001; Sulston and Ferry, 2002; Shreeve, 2004). Patenting driven by profit motives was deeply 
repugnant to Watson. He felt strongly that the sequence data flowing from the HGP should remain 
within the public domain, freely available to all. Meeting opposition on his view, he stepped down 
from his position as director of the NIH-sponsored project in 1992 (Roberts, 1992/256). He was 
replaced by Francis Collins in April 1993 (Roberts, 1993/262). In 1997, the name of the Center 
changed to National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI) (Cook-Deegan, 1989; Barnhart, 
1989). 
 
 
5–Private II: Venter-ing 
 
Craig Venter was not only the initiator of the discussion on patenting genes, he was also pivotal when 
it came to commercialize genome research. A scientist at the NIH during the early 1990’s, running a 
large sequencing lab at the National Institute for Neurological Disorders and Stroke, he felt in 1991 
that private companies could sequence genomes faster than publicly funded laboratories (Shreeve, 
2004). Venter boasted that a newly developed approach could do the sequencing better, and for a 
fraction of the costs the official Human Genome Project was budgeting. Venter claimed to be able to 
find 80% to 90% of the genes within a few years only (Adams et al., 1991; Roberts, 1991/252). This 
ushered the era of competition between the public and the private initiatives in terms of speed and 
efficiency. 
 
Following his vision, Venter left the NIH in 1992 to set up his own biotechnology company. In 
complete contrast to the failure of Walter Gilbert’ attempts to garner private funds in 1987, the time 
now seemed ripe for the development of genetic research by the private sector. Venter set up The 
Institute for Genomic Research (TIGR), a non-profit firm, funded by the investment company 
HealthCare Investment Corporation. He was being offered $70 million to try out his own gene 
identification strategy. In addition, TIGR was also one of the six centers receiving support from the 
NIH (Shreeve, 2004). The arrangement was that its sister company, Human Genome Sciences (HGS), 
led by William Haseltine, would commercialize the products developed by TIGR. The deal was that 
HGS should have exclusive access to TIGR’s Expressed Sequence Tags (EST’s) for a certain time 
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before publication.4 Academic scientists would be able to look at the TIGR database freely after that, 
but the commercial company would have access rights to any further commercial developments. The 
company sold an exclusive license for prior access to the information to the pharmaceutical giant 
SmithKline Beecham for $125 million (Sulston and Ferry, 2002). 
 
In 1995, TIGR published the first completely sequenced genome, that of the bacterium Haemophilus 
influenza. The scientists had carried it out in just a year, using a riskier technique, called whole 
genome shotgun sequencing, that NIH had insisted wouldn’t work and wouldn’t fund (Sulston and 
Ferry, 2002). Sequencers in the publicly funded project had adopted a conservative, methodical 
approach, starting with relatively small chunks of DNA whose positions on the chromosome were 
known, breaking them into pieces, then randomly selecting and sequencing those pieces and finally 
reassembling them (Bostanci, 2004). In contrast, Venter simply shredded the entire genome into small 
fragments and used a computer to reassemble the sequenced pieces by looking for overlapping ends 
(Roberts, 2001/291). 
 
Among other biotech firms involved in gene sequencing, Celera Genomics was founded in 1998 by 
Venter in conjunction with the Perkin-Elmer Corporation, the manufacturer of the world’s fastest 
automatic DNA sequencers. The company would single-handedly sequence the entire human genome 
in just three years, they announced, and for a mere $300 million (Marshall and Pennisi, 1998/280). 
Venter’s goal was to privately sequence the human genome in direct competition with the public 
efforts supported by the NIH and DOE and by the governments of several foreign countries (Venter in 
Science, 1998/280: 1540–1542); see also Human Genome News 1998/9/3; 2000/11/1–2). Using 300 
Perkin-Elmer automatic DNA sequencers along with one of the world’s most powerful computers, 
Celera sequenced the genomes of several model organisms with remarkable speed. Venter called his 
effort “a bargain by comparison to the genome project.” (Roberts, 1991/252: 1619). They continued in 
their efforts of sequencing the entire human genome at a cost of a few million dollars per year, instead 
of the hundreds of millions of the public project. Leaders of the latter began to worry: Should 
Congress fell for Venter’s boldness, it might pull the plug off the public project. His plan would never 
work, they countered, and the sequence would be riddled with holes and impossible to reassemble 
(Roberts, 2001/291). 
 
In a crucial test of the shotgun strategy, Celera first tackled the 180-megabase genome of the fruit fly 
Drosophila melanogaster (Butler, 1999/401; Pennisi, 2000/287). Venter teamed up with a publicly 
funded team headed by Gerald Rubin of UC Berkeley, and by September 1999 announced to have 
carried it out (Shreeve, 2004). Although this did not mean that they had fully finished or even 
assembled the 180 megabase sequence, they had run enough samples through the machines to cover 
the whole genome. According to Venter, this addressed the criticism raised by the public genome 
project and proved that the shotgun methods could work on a big, complex genome. 
 
Venter was thus in the position to threaten the fragile alliance among the publicly funded sequencing 
labs. The contest was punctuated by dueling press releases (Sulston and Ferry, 2002). First Venter 
announced in October 1999 that his crew had sequenced one billion bases of the human genome, a feat 
rejected by the HGP, which noted that Celera hadn’t released the data for other researchers to check. 
Then NIH jumped into the game, announcing in November that it had completed 1 billion bases. 
Venter countered in January 2000 that his crew had compiled DNA sequence covering 90% of the 
human genome; the public consortium asserted in March that it had completed two billion bases, and 
so on. Issues of data access heated up too, with the public consortium denouncing Venter for his plan 
to release his data on the Celera Web site rather than in GenBank, the public database.5 The feud 
                                                
4 An Expressed Sequence Tag (EST) is a tiny portion of an entire gene that can be used to help identify unknown genes and 
to map their positions within a genome. ESTs provide researchers with a quick and inexpensive route for discovering new 
genes, for obtaining data on gene expression and regulation, and for constructing genome maps; 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/), retrieved February 10, 2010). 
5 The sequence of the human DNA is stored in databases available to anyone on the Internet. The U.S. National Center for 
Biotechnology Information (and sister organizations in Europe and Japan) house the gene sequence in a database known as 
GenBank (Benson et al., 2007), along with sequences of known and hypothetical genes and proteins. Other organizations 
present additional data and annotation and tools for visualizing and searching it. 
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became increasingly ugly, with each side disparaging the other’s work and credibility in the press 
(Sulston and Ferry, 2002). 
 
 
6–Public II 
 
The first shift occurred in 1987, when a majority of scientists started to perceive the HPG as 
beneficial. Paul Berg described the change to the new regime as follows: “What is different, however, 
is how biologists view the project […]. There has been an enormous change in thinking about the 
project. […] [Earlier] we could hardly get to the science because of the ominous views people had 
about the project. I think now everyone agrees this is a worthwhile project, and we can get on to 
talking about how one might go about it in the most cost-effective and scientifically effective way.” 
(Paul Berg, cited in Roberts, 1987b/237). Between 1987 and 1992, several relevant steps that brought 
genome sequencing forward, occurred. In 1989, PCR/STS was developed as a way to bring together 
different mapping techniques that had seemed incompatible, in order to facilitate cooperation among 
labs. It made traditional physical mapping obsolete (Roberts 1989b/245; Olson et al., 1989; Jordan and 
Lynch, 1998). In 1990, three groups developed capillary electrophoresis, and in the same year, Lipman 
and colleagues (NCBI) published the algorithm BLAST for aligning sequences (Roberts et al., 2001). 
 
After 1992, other agencies outside the U.S. took on prominent roles, foremost Britain’s Wellcome 
Trust (Sanger Center (UK), opening in 1993), and in October and December 1992, U.S. and French 
teams completed the first physical maps of chromosomes and the genetic maps of the mouse 
respectively. The year of 1993 can be considered as the “tipping point,” defined as when the levels of 
development and commitment from various parties at which the momentum for the HGP became 
unstoppable (Gladwell, 2002). In January 1993, Walter Gilbert remarked that “today, there are ten-fold 
more [markers], and the role of genetic information is ten-fold more obvious to everybody.” (Walter 
Gilbert, cited in Anderson, 1993/259: 300). Consequently, in October 1993, Francis Collins, head of 
NCHGR, requested more money to pursue genome research, on the basis that the budget had not 
increased as fast as the project’s creators recommended. The combined NIH and DOE budget 
remained at roughly $165 million on 1992, when it should have been $219 million based on the 
planning in late 1980’s and adjusted for inflation. Should they not increase the budget, Collins argued 
this would imply delayed medical benefits as well as loss of U.S. biotechnology competitiveness 
(Roberts, 1993/262). 
 
In 1995, NHGRI began to accelerate the effort, funding six pilot projects in high-volume sequencing. 
Another turning point came in 1998 when Robert Waterston at Washington University in St. Louis, 
funded by NHGRI, and his collaborator John Sulston of the Sanger Centre near Cambridge, U.K., 
funded by the Wellcome Trust, announced that they had deciphered the complete genome (97 million 
bases) of the nematode, Caenorhabditis elegans. 
 
Meanwhile, at the Institute for Genomic Research, Venter was perfecting a faster ‘whole-genome 
shotgun’ approach. He wowed to produce the complete genome of the bacterium Haemophilus 
influenzae (1.8 million bases long) using this technique, at record speed. And in May 1998, he dropped 
the bomb: backed by PE Corporation of Norwalk, Connecticut, he announced that Celera Genomics 
would sequence the entire human genome by 2001, using this whole-genome shotgun method. 
 
 
7–Private III: Venture-ing 
 
Venter’s Institute for Genomic Research (TIGR) was soon joined by other biotechnology companies 
that competed directly with the publicly funded Human Genome Project. From 1992 onwards, genome 
scientists in universities found venture capitalists hammering on their doors (Cook-Deegan, 2000; 
2004; Sulston and Ferry, 2002). Prospects for attracting private capital had changed dramatically in the 
five years since the Human Genome project was first outlined and the two years since its official start. 
In 1990 already, a symposium devoted to solicit interest among pharmaceutical firms, organized by 
Craig Venter and Walter Gilbert, drew a respectable audience (Cook-Deegan, 1994). Two years later, 
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new created firms, joint ventures and other private companies became more and more attracted by the 
new potentials, comforted by the feeling that the business of sequencing was on a good track. Several 
small biotechnology firms redirected their efforts towards mapping and sequencing DNA, several new 
firms were founded (including three of the “big four”, Human Genome Sciences, Incyte, and 
Millennium) (Cook-Deegan et al., 2000). As a result, the venture capital community was “getting very 
excited, all the pieces are coming together”, as a venture capitalist has put it (Mark Levin, cited in 
Anderson, 1993/259: 301). The Human Genome Project at that time was perceived to be moving more 
quickly than anyone expected initially and was blessed by the characteristic “bubble mood” (Gisler 
and Sornette, 2009).6 People were extrapolating by anticipating the development of therapeutics in 
short order, expectations that proved to be utterly exaggerated and removed from reality, as reviewed 
recently by Helen Pearson in Nature (2009/460). The HGP was now evolving from a public to a joint 
private/public effort, exemplifying the role that small entrepreneurial firms supported by venture 
capital play in the innovation process (Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, 2007). In fact, private funding 
reached rough parity with government and nonprofit funding in 1993 in the United States. Ever since, 
private genomics research funding has risen even faster (Cook-Deegan et al., 2000). One reason for 
the newly observed openness of the scientists involved in 1992/93 towards private funding might be 
the fact that the NIH and DOE budget remained relatively low (lower than announced initially, see 
above), and thus provoked delays in the effective support of ongoing research. Researchers, as a 
consequence, were more open to private investigators. The years 1992/3 was furthermore 
characterized by a shift from mapping to sequencing. Because industry is best at that kind of factory-
like production, academic-industrial partnerships thus made sense. It was in any case a sign that the 
genome project was indeed succeeding. 
 
Yet, during all this turmoil concerning the public-private rivalry, it seems to have been forgotten that 
the public HGP also contracted with private firms in order to get better, i.e. faster, machines to carry 
out the sequencing. It was Watson himself who, in 1992, argued that the benefits of industrial 
participation far outweighed the potential drawbacks. Academics had launched the project and were 
well on their way to finishing genetic maps. However, Watson saw the time had come to move to large 
scale sequencing, and industry was best at that kind of factory-like production. Academic-industrial 
partnership thus made sense, since the technology was already being developed in university labs. 
Watson himself helped establish a company, from a collaboration between researchers at Cold Spring 
Harbor Laboratory, which Watson directed, and Brookhaven National Laboratory, with the goal of 
developing high-speed sequencing technology (Anderson, 1993/259). 
 
As another example, in March 1992, Walter Gilbert joined University of Utah geneticist Mark 
Skolnick in a company called Myriad Genetics Inc., where he still serves as vice chairman of the 
board. Myriad Genetics, founded in 1991, was devoted to developing cancer therapies by tracing 
genes turned up by the Human Genome Project. The company was funded by Eli Lilly and Co. and the 
investment banking firm Spencer Trask Inc. (Anderson, 1993/259). This case is characteristic of the 
sentiment of the time shared by venture capitalists on the attractiveness of investing into a formerly 
unknown “big” science project. Many among the venture capitalists were interested in financing 
projects connected to genome research, namely developing therapeutics (e.g. Mercator Genetics Inc.), 
while others were interested in focusing on the sequencing process itself.  
 
The attitude toward the HGP had not only changed on Wall Street, but also among scientists 
themselves. While an upheaval occurred among them in 1987 when Gilbert announced his private 
going, a few years later, quite a few scientists were ready to join newly established joint ventures. Eric 
Lander, who in 1992 directed the single largest genome grant (a $24 million over five years) to map 
the entire human genome, still contended that genomic maps were basic infrastructure, and must thus 
be universally and freely available. However, even he agreed upon the idea of a company using public 
available maps to study particular genetic models of diseases (Anderson, 1993/259; Sulston and Ferry, 
2002).  
                                                
6 “It took 4 years to obtain the first billion [base pair mark ] and 4 months to get the second billion. […] The goal for 
completing the working draft has not changed since it was first announced: 90% coverage of the euchromatic [informative] 
portion of the human genome sequence.” (Francis Collins, cited in Roberts, 2000/287: 2396). 
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In 1999, the official HGP started itself to buy sequencing machines from Applied Biosystems Inc., the 
company which supported Craig Venter’s Celera and which in fact initially developed machines for 
Celera only. This caused quite a stir at Celera, leading ABI to promise Celera a priority treatment 
(Shreeve, 2004). These sequencing machines, after all, were the descendents of the first automated 
sequencing machines developed by Leroy Hood and colleagues at Caltech in 1986, a publicly funded 
endeavor (Lewin, 1986a/233). 
 
At the organizational level, the actors of the public program wasted no time in increasing the pace and 
in reorienting their schedule in an attempt to win the race. Changes were indeed very much needed, as 
a report reviewing the development of the public HGP insisted (Koonin, 1998). Francis Collins thus 
announced new goals for the public project in September 1998, six months after Venter’s surprise 
announcement (Marshall, 1998/281). First, the consortium would complete the entire genome by 2003, 
two years ahead of schedule, but also two years behind the date announced by Venter. And, in a 
dramatic departure from previous philosophy, the project would produce a ‘rough draft,’ covering 
90% of the genome by the spring of 2001. Scientists were clamoring for the data even in rough form, 
Collins said by way of explanation. Yet he also admitted that producing a rough draft and making it 
public was a strategic move to undercut any patent position Celera or other businesses might claim. 
 
 
8–The biotech financial bubble 
 
If we are correct that a bubble spirit was indeed developing in the social component of the HGP, there 
should be some observable signature of it in the financial markets. Indeed, new biotech companies 
dedicated to genomics, as well as established pharmaceutical firms positioned to exploit drug 
applications resulting from genomics, should have drawn high demand, as investors are often attracted 
by promises of great future incomes. High demand in turn pushes prices up. If the bubble spirit was 
active, the public-private race should have led to a kind of positive feedback, in which (i) the higher 
the belief in future gains, the higher the demand, (ii) the higher the demand, the higher the price, (iii) 
the higher the price, the higher the valuation of biotech companies, (iv) the higher the valuation of 
biotech companies, the more attractive and powerful they become, (v) the more attractive and 
powerful, the higher the demand … leading to an accelerating price spiral. 
 
In order to test this hypothesis, we analyze the Amex Biotechnology Index (^BTK) and the Nasdaq 
Composite indices from Jan. 1997 to June 2002. The Amex Biotechnology Index is designed to 
measure the performance of a cross section of companies in the biotechnology industry that are 
primarily involved in the use of biological processes to develop products or provide services. The 
index is equal-dollar weighted, designed to ensure that each of its component securities is represented 
in approximate equal dollar value. Launched in 1971, the Nasdaq Composite Index is broad based and 
includes today over 3,000 securities, mainly in so-called new technology sectors, i.e, it includes the 
ICT (Internet-Communication-Technology) as well as the Biotech sectors. It is calculated under a 
market capitalization weighted methodology index and includes mainly U.S. firms listed on the 
Nasdaq Stock Market (with some exceptions).  
 
Figure 1 shows the Biotech index over the time interval from Jan. 1997 to June 2002. Its inset shows 
the same data magnified from June 1998 to April 2000. One can observe an almost quadrupling of the 
index from 1998 to the peak occurring in early March 2000. Also notable is the fact that this 
quadrupling developed as an accelerated growth that can be termed “super-exponential”, to stress the 
fact that the growth rate grew itself as the price increased. Recall that a constant growth rate qualifies 
just an exponential growth. Here, for the Biotech index, the growth is super-exponential, which means 
that investors expect for instance 10% return over the first 6 month period, then 20% over the next 
period, then 40%, then 80% … which is clearly unsustainable!  
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Fig. 1: Amex Biotechnology Index (in logarithmic scale) from Jan. 1997 to June 2002. The inset shows the same 
data magnified from June 1998 to April 2000. The vertical line indicates the time (30 Nov 1999) when the 
Biotech index disconnects and shoots up until the crash in early March 2000, leaving the Nasdaq index largely 
behind. The oscillating continuous lines in the main figure and inset correspond to the calibration of equation (1) 
to the Biotech index up to the peak.  Note the upward curvature in this log(price) versus time, which qualifies a 
super-exponential accelerating price, qualifying a bubble. 
 
 
Such super-exponential growth is our technical definition of a bubble, according to the methodology 
developed over the past 15 years in many papers and books by our group.  We refer to the broad 
overviews (Johansen et al., 1999; Johansen and Sornette, 2006; Sornette, 2003; Sornette and Johansen, 
2001; Sornette and Zhou, 2006; Jiang et al., 2010). In short, the methodology is based on the 
hypothesis that positive feedback on the growth rate of an asset’s price by price, return and other 
financial and economic variables leads to faster-than-exponential (power law hyperbolic) price 
growth. The signature of positive feedbacks at work during a bubble is quantitatively identified in a 
time series by a faster-than-exponential power law component, and by the existence of increasing low 
frequency volatility, these two ingredients occurring either in isolation or simultaneously with varying 
relative amplitudes.  A convenient mathematical representation has been found to be the existence of a 
power law growth decorated by oscillations in the logarithm of time.  The simplest mathematical 
embodiment is obtained as the first order expansion of the log-periodic power law (LPPL) model:  
 
(1) ln P(t) =  A + B |t - tc|α + C |t - tc|α  cos[ω ln |t - tc| + φ]  + ε(t)   , 
 
where P(t) is the price of the asset, t is time and ε(t) is a noise residual.  There are seven parameters in 
this nonlinear equation, but two (α and ω) stand out in their role for qualifying a bubble regime. 
Extensive tests have led to the hypothesis that the LPPL signals are excellent diagnostic tools of the 
existence of a bubble (see for instance, Sornette et al., 2009). The parameter tc represents the time at 
which the bubble ends, either in a crash or in a less-dramatic leveling off of the growth leading to a 
change of regime.  
 
Figure 1 shows clear evidence of such (log-periodic) power law (super-exponential) growth of the 
Biotech index from Jan. 1998 to 2000, as exemplified by the overall upward curvature in this 
log(index) as a function of time. Figure 2 shows the Nasdaq index over the same period. The results 
are qualitatively and quantitatively similar. In particular, the super-exponential behavior is strikingly 
analogous to that observed for the Biotech index over the same period.  
 
But was the biotech bubble illustrated in figure 1 really fueled by the HGP?  Or could it be that the 
Biotech sector was in fact more driven by the ICT sector, the dot.com frenzy pushing with it all 
companies with a technological flavor to the sky? This second scenario is quite plausible since the ICT 
sector witnessed an extraordinary bubble from 1995 to 2000, which ended with a dramatic crash in 
April 2000 (Johansen and Sornette, 2000), as shown in figure 2. And the Biotech sector also crashed at 
the same time, as shown in figure 1.  
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To disentangle the HGP factor from the ICT factor with respect to their respective potential impact on 
the Biotech sector, we express the Biotech index “in currency units” of the Nasdaq index, i.e, we write 
 
(2) Biotech-in-Nasdaq(t) = Biotech-index(t) / Nasdaq(t) . 
 
Taking the ratio of the Biotech and Nasdaq indices amounts to constructing a proxy for the HGP factor 
that we are trying to identify. This ratio has a clear economic meaning: it amounts to study the value of 
a portfolio that buys the Biotech sector and “shorts” (sells) the Nasdaq index. Equivalently, this 
Biotech-in-Nasdaq(t) ratio views the Nasdaq index as the currency used to purchase the Biotech index. 
In this way, we shortcut any influence of the U.S. dollar and directly extract the component of the 
bubble in the Biotech sector not present in the Nasdaq composite index. This approach is particularly 
well-suited to remove the influence of monetary policy as well as international influence on the value 
of the reference currency, which can play a big impact on the analysis of anomalous market regimes 
(Zhou and Sornette, 2005). 
 
If both Biotech and Nasdaq indices move more or less in synchrony (in econometric jargon, this is 
often referred to as “co-integration” (Engle and Granger, 1987)), we should expect the Biotech-in-
Nasdaq(t) to be more or less flat and noisy, which is the case before November 1999, as shown in 
figure 3. However, from the end of November 1999, indicated by the vertical line in figure 3, the 
Biotech-in-Nasdaq(t) shoots up until the peak on 7 March 2000 followed by the crash. Clearly, in the 
last three months of the unfolding of the two bubbles, the Biotech index took a life of its own, 
accelerating even faster than the Nasdaq index. The aftermath of the March 2000 crash is also 
strikingly different: the Nasdaq index does not recover over the period shown here until much after 
mid-2002, while the Biotech index strikingly recovers after the large crash and breaks its previous 
record in much less than a year, continuing its ascension till the end of 2001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.2: Nasdaq Composite indices (in logarithmic scale) from Jan. 1997 to June 2002. The inset shows the same 
data magnified from June 1998 to April 2000. The vertical line indicates the time 30 Nov 1999 (see Figs.1 and 
3). The oscillating continuous lines in the main figure and inset correspond to the calibration of equation (1) to 
the Nasdaq index up the peak.  Note the upward curvature in this log(price) versus time, which qualifies a super-
exponential accelerating price, qualifying a bubble. 
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Fig.3: Biotech-in-Nasdaq(t) (= Biotech-index(t) / Nasdaq(t)) defined by equation (2) (in logarithmic scale) as a 
function of time from Jan. 1997 to June 2002. The inset shows the same data magnified from June 1998 to April 
2000. The vertical line indicates the time 30 Nov 1999 (see Figs.1 and 2). 
 
 
 
9–Upshot 
 
In April 2000, the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment of the Committee on Science of the U.S. 
House of Representatives conducted hearings on the status and benefits of genome sequencing in the 
public and private sectors. Robert Waterston, director of the HGP sequencing center at Washington 
University, St. Louis, pointed to fruitful data sharing between the HGP and the private sector. 
Examples among others included collaborations led by the pharmaceutical company Merck to develop 
partial sequences identifying genes. These efforts showed that, despite the public-private race and the 
war rhetoric, sharing of data was finally perceived by all parties as a worthwhile endeavor in order to 
increase knowledge and ensure future discoveries. 
 
Behind the scenes, Ari Patrinos of DOE played the mediator, and finally brokered a truce under which 
both groups would announce their drafts at the same time, thereby sharing the glory. Venter would still 
not deposit his data in GenBank, as the consortium wanted, but promised to publish his findings in 
accordance with the terms of the 1996 “Bermuda Statement,” by releasing new data annually (in 
contrast, the public HGP released its new data daily). Unlike the publicly funded project, though, he 
would not permit free redistribution or commercial use of the data (Human Genome News, 1996/7/6). 
Eventually the HGP and Celera did manage to publish simultaneously their results, however in 
separate journals (Nature and Science respectively). And Venter finally conceded that the public data 
had been useful in his own work.  
 
A ‘rough draft’ (not the full sequencing) of the genome was finished in 2000 (announced jointly by 
then U.S. president Bill Clinton and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair on June 26, 2000). Ongoing 
sequencing led to the announcement of the essentially complete genome in April 2003, two years 
earlier than initially planned. In May 2006, another milestone was passed on the way to full 
completion of the project, when the sequence of the last chromosome was announced. According to 
the definition employed by the International Human Genome Project, the genome has been completely 
sequenced by the end of 2003. However, there are still a number of regions of the human genome for 
which the project can be considered unfinished.  
 
The fact that the project came to an end earlier than planned can thus be attributed mainly to the 
public/private competition, and not so much to the intrinsic increased speed of the underlying 
technology involved in sequencing, as has been argued on various occasions (e.g. The Department of 
Energy and the Human Genome Project Fact Sheet, from 
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www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/project/whydoe.shtml; retrieved March 3, 2010). 
Rather, the competition increased efficiency, for the benefit of the project, by forcing the public effort 
to take more risks, leading to accelerated results that, in turn, helped the private initiative. Figure 4 
provides a synoptic measure of the development of the HGP, by showing the number genomic patent 
applications per year after 1985. For all types of patents, the peak followed by a rather fast decay 
occurring in 2000 or 2001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Overview of genomic patent applications after 1985. Source: Aurora Plomer and Peter Taylor, ESRC 
Complexity Se Nasdaq Composite indices minar Series, 26th November 2008. 
 
 
 
10–Discussion 
 
We have presented a detailed history of the development of the Human Genome Project from 1986 to 
2003. This development is characterized by a formidable competition between the initially public 
project and several private initiatives, which became more and more prominent, so much as to force 
the former to adapt and change drastically its strategy. The explosion of interests and commitments 
from the private sector and from venture capitalists that continued till the completion of the project is 
the consequence of great expectations on commercial applications in drugs and medicine that could 
result from the sequencing and mapping of the entire human genome. The race and mutual interactions 
between the public and private HGP sustains the hypothesis that strong social interactions between 
enthusiastic supporters of the HGP weaved a network of reinforcing feedbacks that led to a 
widespread endorsement and extraordinary commitment by those involved in the project. This thus 
supports the social bubble hypothesis (Gisler and Sornette, 2009; Sornette, 2008). 
 
But one could argue that the evidence presented here does not describe a bubble, but just the dynamics 
of a project based on rational expectations. Thus, it is worthwhile to briefly discuss whether or not the 
great anticipations on the commercial and medical applications of the HGP turned out to be fulfilled 
and on what time scales. As a matter of fact, now that the human genome has been sequenced almost 
completely, there is still little understanding of how genes actually work. Having the complete gene 
set on the table, the knowledge of the genetic map and sequence is now considered by experts to be 
only a starting point for future research in biology and medicine. It is now widely recognized that it 
will take decades to exploit the fruits of the HGP, via a slow and arduous process aiming at 
disentangling the extraordinary complexity of the problem (Pearson, 2009/460).7 In this sense, the 
HGP illustrates vividly the “social bubble” hypothesis, according to which investors and actors 
develop extraordinary over-optimistic expectations of short-term applications during the development 
of a project, making them take risks that would not be justified by a standard cost-benefit analysis in 
the presence of huge uncertainties over long-time scales. It is the effect of social interactions and 
                                                
7 See also e.g. Allan Bradley, Director of The Wellcome Trust Sanger Institute9, Cambridge, UK, stating that “We shouldn’t 
expect immediate major breakthroughs but there is no doubt we have embarked on one of the most exciting chapters of the 
book of life.” (March 2004; http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/A1091323#back9; retrieved February 10, 2010). 
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amplification that created the atmosphere in which the HGP bubble was catalyzed and could blossom 
(Sornette, 2008). 
 
Coming back to the issues raised in the introduction on the role of government as a public 
entrepreneur and venture capitalist for long-term very risky projects, we are led to conclude that the 
competition between the public and private sector actually played in favor of the former, since its 
financial burden as well as its horizon were significantly reduced (for a long time against its will) by 
the active role of the later. The fact that a social as well as financial bubble developed during the 
course of the HGP helped tremendously in this respect. This supports our hypothesis that social 
bubbles are essential carriers for pushing segments or even sometimes the whole of society to invest 
considerable efforts in very risky endeavors that brings enormous rewards only decades later, that is, 
after many capital investments have been lost on the short term. We go as far as suggesting that the 
government and public agencies were lucky in playing on the HGP bubble. This suggests that 
governments can take advantage of the social bubble mechanism to catalyze long-term investments by 
the private sector that would not otherwise be supported. Social bubbles thus provide a mechanism for 
aligning the apparently incompatible incentives of the private sector, that privileges (perceived) low-
risk investments providing short-term returns, with the long-term social benefits of basic research for 
scientific and technical knowledge. 
 
While there is little to show in terms of progress in medical diagnosis and treatment, in pharmaceutical 
development, in agriculture, and in other industrial sectors, the HGP catalyzed enormous technological 
progresses in DNA-based methods. As shown in figure 5, the cost of sequencing and mapping 
underwent an astonishing decrease. Actually, announced by Complete Genomics, a startup based in 
Mountain View, CA, a complete human-genome sequence (not a full genome sequencing!) can soon 
be ordered for $5,000, thanks to a new sequencing service. Such a stunning price drop may completely 
change the way human-genomics research can be carried out. A $5,000 genome would enable new 
studies to identify rare genetic variants linked to common diseases, and it could open up the 
sequencing market to diagnostic and pharmaceutical companies, making genome sequencing a routine 
part of clinical drug testing (see http://www.technologyreview.com/biomedicine/21466; retrieved 
March 3, 2010). Another illustration is the recent publication of a draft of the sequence of the giant 
panda genome with 2.25 gigabases, using so-called next-generation sequencing technology (Li et al., 
2010). This work provides a foundation for comparative mammalian genetic research, and many usher 
novel applications. The fruits of the HGP are thus progressively coming, almost a decade after 
completion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Illustration of the increasing efficiency measured by the fast decrease of the cost per base and the 
concomitant accelerating pace of sequencing; retrieved from 
www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/project/whydoe.shtml; June 1, 2009. 
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The HGP is initiating other initiatives, based on the recognition that there is much that genomics 
cannot do, and that “the future belongs to proteomics,” according to Stanley Fields (researcher at 
Howard Hughes Medical Institute, and Adjunct Professor of Microbiology at the University of 
Washington School of Medicine, Seattle). Proteomics means the characterization of the entire array of 
proteins encoded by our genes. This is a huge task as different types of cells in the human body each 
have a different set of proteins, different protein structure and function can be modified in many ways, 
such as phosphorylation or glycosylation and, a single gene can encode for multiple proteins. All these 
possibilities result in a proteome that is an order of magnitude more complex than the genome, 
according to Fields as reported by Haroon Ashraf in The Lancet (2001/357: 531–2). Present efforts 
include searches for protein’s involvement in diseases and its potential for a drug target and 
classifications of all the proteins and their [amino-acid] sequences. Will a new era emerge, that will 
promote a social proteomics bubble? The present work may help in understanding the necessary 
ingredients, the pros and cons, and the consequences. 
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U.S. Human Genome Project Funding 
($Millions) 
FY DOE NIH* U.S. Total 
1988 10.7 17.2 27.9 
1989 18.5 28.2 46.7 
1990 27.2 59.5 86.7 
1991 47.4 87.4 134.8 
1992 59.4 104.8 164.2 
1993 63.0 106.1 169.1 
1994 63.3 127.0 190.3 
1995 68.7 153.8 222.5 
1996 73.9 169.3 243.2 
1997 77.9 188.9 266.8 
1998 85.5 218.3 303.8 
1999 89.9 225.7 315.6 
2000 88.9 271.7 360.6 
2001 86.4 308.4 394.8 
2002 90.1 346.7 434.3 
2003 64.2 372.8 437.0 
Total 1015.0 2785.8 3798.3 
 
Table 1: The DOE and NIH genome programs set aside 3% to 5% of their respective total annual budgets for the 
study of the project's ELSI issues (retrieved from 
www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/project/whydoe.shtml, June 1, 2009). Slightly different figures 
for the years 1988–1991 are given in Watson & Cook-Deegan, 1991. 
 
